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No Brasil existe um sistema de saúde com dois acessos. Aqueles, com recursos, têm acesso 
ao sistema privado de saúde que fornece tratamento, com qualidade quando demandado, 
enquanto o restante da população tem que ser atendida pelo congestionado sistema de 
clínicas e hospitais públicos ou atendidos pelo sistema privado pago com recursos 
públicos. Dados de amostra de domicílios são utilizados para determinar quais grupos 
sócio-econômicos dependem do sistema público de saúde. As tendências demográficas 
atuais indicam que mais e mais pessoas vão utilizar o já congestionado sistema público de 
saúde nas próximas décadas.  Um modelo estilizado de escolha é estimado e seus 
parâmetros são usados para se obter evidências, a partir de simulações, sobre as 
conseqüências sobre o bem estar do aumento no congestionamento e sobre as políticas que 
poderiam reduzir seu impacto, como por exemplo subsídios no uso do sistema partícula de 
saúde. 
Palavras-chave 
sistema de saúde, exclusão social, máxima verossimilhança 
 
Abstract 
In Brazil, there exists a two-tiered system of healthcare access. Those with 
sufficient means have access to a private system of healthcare that provides quality 
treatment on demand, while the remainder of the country relies on an overburdened 
system of public clinics and hospitals.  Household survey data are used to 
determine which socio-demographic groups rely most on this public healthcare 
system.  Current demographic trends suggest that the public healthcare 
infrastructure will become more and more heavily used in the coming decades.  A 
stylized model of healthcare choice is estimated, and its parameters are used to 
conduct counterfactual simulations of the welfare implications of this increased 
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congestion, and of policies to offset it, like private healthcare subsidies. 
Keyword 







  In Brazil, there exists a two-tiered system of healthcare.  Those with sufficient means, or 
whose employers provide health coverage, have access to a private system of healthcare that 
provides quality treatment on demand.  The remainder of the country, conversely, relies on a 
system of public clinics and hospitals.  As is the case with most public healthcare systems around 
the world, the Brazilian system is characterized by long waiting times, with the practical 
implication that those who are forced to rely on it spend more time being sick and, subsequently, 
have a diminished health stock. 
  This two-tiered system of healthcare is a particularly relevant concern in Brazil in light of 
recent changes in the country’s socio-demographic structure.  In 1990, only 6.7% of Brazil’s 
population was over age 60, but by 2010 this is expected to be 9.7% and by 2030, 16.9% [World 
Bank (1994), (2000)].  During the last twenty years, family sizes amongst the poorer segments of 
Brazilian society (i.e., those who typically rely most on the public provision of healthcare), have 
been larger than in wealthier segments of society.  This large population group has been aging, 
and is nearing a time when its healthcare needs will grow rapidly [Cutler and Meara (1998)].  
Concerns have been raised that the Brazilian public health system will not be up to meeting this 
growing demand.  In particular, already-long waiting times for treatment will continue to grow, 
with the practical implication that many of the poorest segments of society will receive no 
healthcare at all.  This mechanism of social exclusion of the poor, elderly, and rural population 
will increase at the rate at which this segment of the Brazilian population is growing.  
  This mechanism may have long-run feedback effects as well. Growing demand due to the 
increasing size of the poor, elderly population, as well as the increasing cost of treatment for a 
limited supply of public health services, will mean that the poorest segments of Brazilian society 
will begin to lose access to healthcare.  This will result in a declining health stock for the poor, 
reinforcing their socio-economic position.  To the extent that the poor continue to have larger 
families (e.g., as a retirement-insurance mechanism or a source of labor for subsistence 
agriculture), this will lead to further strains on the public healthcare system in the future and, 
likely further failures. 
  This paper seeks to accomplish three tasks. First, we will use an outstanding set of 
Brazilian household survey data to characterize which social groups have access to private 
healthcare.  In particular, we employ the 1998 PNAD, a broad household survey that includes 
detailed information on health, healthcare consumption, and, most importantly, the source from 
which one receives health services.  We will argue that certain groups are systematically denied 
access to private healthcare in an indirect fashion.  After identifying which groups are subject to 
this form of exclusion, the second part of our research will construct and empirically identify a 
stylized model of choice between alternative sources of healthcare provision, from which we will 
be able to derive a crude measure of the welfare consequences of the increased healthcare 
congestion costs that are likely to accompany the demographic transition we currently see in  
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Brazil. With these welfare conclusions, in the final part of our research, we will be able to 
analyze the implications of policy alternatives such as private healthcare subsidies. 
  Section 2 of this paper describes describes the household survey data we will use for our 
analysis.  Section 3 outlines our methodological approach for demonstrating that indirect 
exclusion exists and measuring its consequences, and reports how the implicit “price” of public 
healthcare varies across socio-demographic groups in Brazil.  In Section 4, we carry out two 
counterfactual simulations.  In the first, we examine the impacts of an increase in the implicit 
price of public healthcare, like that which would arise from the increased congestion that would 
accompany the predicted increases in healthcare demand in Brazil.  In the second simulation, we 
consider the impact of a private healthcare subsidy being provided by the government, making 
that option more accessible to groups who had previously been able to afford only public 
healthcare.  Given the propensity of individuals to switch their source of healthcare provision, we 
find that such a policy might only result in rent transfers to those segments of society that we 
would not consider to be “excluded”.  Section 5 concludes by suggesting limitations to, and 






  The 1998 PNAD is an annual household survey on socio-economic conditions of the 
Brazilian population under the responsibility o9f the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estastistica (IBGE).The 1998 PNAD had a special supplement dealing with the health conditions 
of the Brazilian population. The supplement includes detailed information on health.  The survey 
covers 344,975 individuals and  98,166 households
2. In the analysis, however, the number of 
observations will be smaller due Use of this survey data presents a number of advantages.  First, 
it is one of the only surveys to collect data on health of the population in a  consistent fashion.  
Second, data collection on health come with the full set of socio-economic variables on the 
individuals and on the household.  Still, the collection of such data relies on the training of data 
enumerators to record health status. Thus, when looking at reported illnesses, the accuracy might 
not be as high as it would be if medical professionals were examining the individuals and 
reporting their illness. 
  The PNAD data set also presents some disadvantages -- it is restricted to the urban sector 
in the northern region of Brazil and is, therefore, not representative of the whole northen region 
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of Brazil. However, the data set covers pretty well the remaining regions of Brazil and the 
exclusion of the rural north does not harm the representability of the PNAD survey to the extent 
that the rural population in the north is very scarce.  In our analysis we will use the household 
data set instead of the larger individual sample data. The reason is that decision on  health is a 
major decision making process and is assumed to be a household decision.    The analysis will 
take care of important characteristics of individuals within the household, as for instance, taking 
into account the proportion of children and the elderly people within the household because they 
are important aspects for the decision making process on health.  Table2 shows some major 
characteristics of the data set. 
Variable With_HP is the proportion of the household heads who has a private health insurance 
paid by himself or by his employer. It amounts to 17% of the total household heads. The 
remaining households use the public health system. Variable PrivHP gives the household who 
pay their own health plan. Whopay  shows the proportion of people having employer-provide 
private health insurance. The average household income is R$ 962.50 monthly. The average 
payment of health insurance for the 6.9% who pay their own medical insurance is R$ 150.31 and 
their average household income is R$  2137.50 and R$ 781.19 of household per capita income. 
Income reported in Table 2 is the average household per capita income. Households who pays 
their own health plan have per capita income more than twice as much as the mean household  
per capita income estimated with the household sample data.  
The Metro variable gives the proportion of the household heads living in Brazilian metropolitan 
areas. Urban gives the proportion of household heads living in urban areas. Age60 is  variable 
that specifying the proportion of people in the household above 60 years of age. Variable f_kind2 
gives the proportion of people bellow age 14.     
 The proportion of the households that did not report any kind of illness is 49.1%. Close to 51% 
reported some kind of illness and some of than reported as being stroke by two or more illness at 
the same time. The proportion of people looking for any kind of medical treatment in the last two 
weeks is 13.1%. Table 1 was built using the evaluation of the quality of the health system using 
the perceived quality of attendment of those 13.1% of the households who looked for medical 
treatment in the last two weeks. The reported illness are self explanatory and they are the illness 
reported by the head of the household. 
The set of race-differentiation variables are White, Mixed, Black and Yellow. Yellow are mainly 
the Asian descended household heads. The proportion of blacks is quite small, however, a large 
part of those people include in the mixed racial group are actually black people.   
The characteristics of the private health plans acquired by 6,639 head of households are 
presented in the bottom part Table 2.These characteristics are used in the estimation of the 
shadow price for public health plans in a hedonic price regression with a Heckman correction 
and the results are presented in Table 5. All the attributes, are defined by a set of dummy 
variables permitting thus a complete description of the type of private health insurance available 
in Brazil today.  
The variable plcons is one when the health plan covers doctors appointment and zero otherwise.  
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The value of .9804, presented in Table 2, means that almost all health insurance bought by head 
of households coves visits to doctors. Pllist is one when the health insurance policy present a list 
of authorized doctors , hospitals and laboratories that can be used by the policy holders and is 
zero otherwise. 92.47% of the private health insurance policies present a list of authorized 
doctors, hospitals and laboratories. The value for variable plreemb indicates that 30.99% of the 
health plans permit reimbursement of medical expenses when the individual is attended by 
doctors or health centers not affiliated to the health plan. Variable called plother indicates that 
81.15% of the policy holders can be attended by doctors, hospitals and laboratories in cities 
others than the one they reside. pldent indicates that only 21.94% hold health insurance covering 
dental treatment. It is possible to observe that this attribute is not a widespread characteristic of 
the private health insurance. Plans having this attribute are more expensive than the ones that do 
not have it. Paymore is a variable capturing the fact that some health insurance policies impose a 
limit in total medical expenses and anything above this limit would have to be paid by the policy 
holder
3. Variable plexam indicates that 95.60% of the private health plan allow policy holder to 
take complementary lab exams during treatment.92.83% of the private policy holders are 
allowed to be covered for hospitalization. This facet of the private health plan is indicated by 
variable plinter. Variable platend indicates that 80.54% of policy holders are allowed to be 
attended by medical services under contract with the heath insurance company. Very few health 
plans cover the acquisition of medicines and drugs. Plmedic indicates that this attribute is very 
special and covers only 4.85% of the private health insurance holders. Among the health 
insurance holder, only 3.07% allow dental treatment. This aspect of the health insurance is 
represented by variable odonto in Table 2.    
           
3.  Research Methodology 
 
  In order to characterize indirect exclusion from private healthcare in Brazil, we adopt a 
two-pronged methodological approach.  First, we employ the detailed survey information in the 
1998 PNAD data set, described in Section 2, to determine, generally, which groups in Brazilian 
society have access to private health insurance and which rely on public healthcare.  Being 
relegated to public healthcare is not a direct form of exclusion, but rather one based on relative 
prices for private and public healthcare that may be different for individuals from different 
segments of society.  Moreover, differences in employment patterns for individuals from 
different socio-economic groups will influence their access to employer-provided private health 
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3.1 Public v. Private Healthcare and Brazilian Socio-Demographic Groups 
 
(3.1.1)                                              
'
, (1 )( ) ii j Py X β == Φ  
 
  We expect certain groups, based on race, education, and location in Brazil, to be 
systematically m ore relian t on the public healthcare system.  First, we investigate which groups 
fall into this category with a simple Probit regression [Greene (2000)] of the following form: 
                                                 
 
4 We avoid this difficult issue (i.e., health insurance as an attribute of a job for which an individual may or may not face a corresponding 
reduction in pay) by considering only those individuals who either buy private insurance directly (i.e., those who do not receive it through an employer) 
or use the SUS. 
where 
  yi  = form of healthcare coverage for individual i (1 = private, 0 = public) 
  Xi = socio-economic attributes of individual i; these include 
    - Race (Black, Asian, Mixed, White) 
  -   A g e  
    - Education is defined by years of schooling. 
- Household Income 
     - Regional Indicators: 
    - Percentage of Persons in the Household with less than fourteen y ears of  
age                                                
                       - Percentage of People above 60 years of Age 
           - Household Income: the total sum of wage and other types of income of                      
individuals living in the household.  
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                         - Migrator is one if the individual is outside the place where he or she was 
born  and zero otherwise. 
                       - f_kind2 is proportion of people bellow fourteen years of age living in the                        
household.  
                      -  Age60  is  the  proportion  of  people  the  age  of  sixty  years    living  in  the                         
household.   
 
The results of this regression, which are found in Table 3, correspond to general perceptions 
about Brazilian healthcare.  Those who tend to be more reliant on the public system are less 
educated, male, come from the Black and Mixed racial groups and from the Northern, 
Center western region of Brazil, have lower incomes, and are old people. The presence of 
people above sixty years of age is highly significant and the presence of people bellow 
fourteen years of age does not make a difference in terms of making the household going 
into the private health plan.  Given the results described in Table 1 regarding differences in 
the quality of healthcare across providers, this alone could be considered evidence of 
exclusion of these groups. 
  Table 4 provides additional evidence along these lines.  Specifically, it presents the 
results of a number of Probit regressions in which a dummy variable indicating that an 
individual has suffered from a particular disease (e.g., depression, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, 
respiratory ailment, hypertension, cardiac disease, tuberculosis, cirrhosis, tendinitis, and 
kidney disease) is regressed on a set of individual attributes, including the form of 
healthcare provision (i.e., SUS v. private) that the individual uses.   The idea here is that an 
individual’s health stock, which determines how likely he is to suffer from any of these 
ailments, is, in part, determined by the quality of the healthcare he receives.  An individual 
who relies on the public system might, therefore, receive lower quality care, or less care in 
general (if waiting times for treatment are worse), leading to a lower health stock and a 
higher likelihood of disease.  These results should be interpreted with extreme caution, 
however, as we would suspect the form of healthcare provision to be simultaneously 
determined with the individual’s health stock; e.g., an individual who knows he is likely to 
develop cancer might purchase private health insurance in order to guarantee himself a 
higher quality of care.  The presence of an endogenous variable in a Probit regression can 
potentially lead to inconsistent estimates of all the model’s parameters. 
The results, however, are very much consistent with a priori expectations about health and 
about the Brazilian health system Women, generally, are less likely to suffer from almost all 
diseases but Cirrhose. Women seems to be healthier than man. Higher income follows good 
health, meaning that poor people are more likely to suffer from some of the illness defined 
for the PNAD survey. One important point is that people with private health plan- either 
self paid or employer paid -are more likely to suffer from some of the illness, while 
healthier people are less likely to go to a private paid health plan The illness seems to strike 
more the Northeastern regions. People from the Southern and Southeastern regions are more  
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likely to report cardiac, cancer, depression  and respiratory diseases.    
   
3.2 A Model of Individual Healthcare Choice 
 
  While describing which elements of Brazilian society are more likely to rely on 
publicly provided healthcare, the preceding analysis does not provide any way of measuring 
the welfare consequences of this indirect form of exclusion.  In order to do so, we need to 
develop a more elaborate model that takes into account the fact that individuals optimally 
choose what form of health insurance to obtain in the face of market prices and a budget 
constraint.  The second part of our empirical analysis develops such a model.  The binding 
constraints on the scope of the conclusions that can be taken away from this model come 
from the lack of data describing individuals’ full income endowments and actual 
expenditure patterns on health and non-health commodities over time.  Instead, the model 
takes a stylized view, describing the individual’s choice of health coverage as a choice 
between alternative types of insurance in a static context.  To the extent that individuals 
change health insurance status during the course of their life, this may bias our answers.  
  In particular, we assume that individual i chooses that form of healthcare provision 








Ci represents i ’s consumption of a composite numeraire commodity, Hi represents the 
consumption of effective healthcare services (the price for these services, Pi
H is allowed to 
differ by individual, and to reflect the quality of the nominal healthcare consumed), and Ii 
represents the individual’s income.  Pi
H will also differ according to the form of healthcare 
provision chosen; i.e., Pi
S for SUS healthcare and Pi
P for privately provided healthcare.  The 
chief source of difficulty in this analysis is that Pi
S is not observed (all SUS healthcare is 
nominally free), but is rather only a shadow price on SUS healthcare consumption. 






which differs by whether the individual chooses SUS healthcare (V(Pi
S,Ii)) or private 
healthcare (V(Pi
P,Ii)).  Taking the optimal allocation of income between composite 



































consumption and healthcare as given, individual i ’s choice between the two forms of 
healthcare provision can be modeled as a comparison of these two indirect utility functions.  





Because of the simple functional forms that we have employed, this boils down to Pi
S #  Pi
P.  
The price of an effective unit of public healthcare is not an observed magnitude; nominally, 
public healthcare is free to everyone in Brazil.  It has a price, however, in the form of time 
in and disutility of crowded waiting rooms, etc... (see discussion in Section 2).  We would 
expect this price to differ across individuals according to their opportunity cost of time, 
preferences for cleanliness, and disutility of congestion; i.e. differences for which we hope 
to be able to control with a set of observable individual attributes (Xi). 
  The available data allow us to recover each individual’s shadow price for an 
effective unit of public healthcare by using inequality (4.2.4).  Once we have done so, we 
will have all the tools necessary to consider the welfare impacts of an increase in the 
congestion costs associated with receiving health services from the SUS.  In particular, 
assuming that the individual chooses the healthcare option that maximizes his indirect 
utility (with the individual’s perception of the quality difference between public and private 
provision factored into that price), private healthcare will be chosen if Pi
P #  Pi
S.  Pi
P is 
observed in available data.
5  We parameterize the natural logarithm of Pi
S as a linear 
function of individual attributes (Xi) and an unobservable determinant (, i), which is assumed 
to be identically and independently normally distributed with a unit variance and zero mean.  
The choice of private health coverage is then determined by the following condition being 
satisfied: 
.2.5)                                                 ln
pp
iii PX βε ≤+  
                                                 
 
5 In particular, we observe in PNAD data the price of the private health insurance paid for everyone who opted for that form of coverage.  
We impute private health insurance premiums for the rest of the sample by (1) regressing the observed private premiums on individual attributes 
and attributes of the policy, (2) controlling for the selection into private healthcare provision with a Heckman-correction term- the results of the 
Heckman procedure is reported in Table 5-  , and (3) fitting premiums for all individuals for a standardized policy.  In particular, the 
standardization we adopt sets all of the attributes of the healthcare policy to their simplest values -- i.e., to give the price of a policy without any 
“bells or whistles”.  This creates a level playing ground for comparison of the individual’s decision between public and private coverage. 









which will be the case if: 
 
(3.2.6)                                           
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which occurs with probability 1 - Μ (ln Pi
P - Xi!∃ ).  Similarly, the probability that individual 
i chooses public health coverage is given by Μ (ln Pi
P - Xi!∃ ).  We can therefore write the 
likelihood of observing all of the health coverage choices of the individuals in the data set 
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This likelihood function is maximized over the parameter vector, ∃ , using data describing 
the decisions and attributes of a 10% subsample of household heads in the PNAD.  The use 
of only household heads eliminates the correlation in insurance type between members of a 
household that exists in the full data set.  Eliminating data with missing observations for 
some variables, this yields a sample size of N = 8267.  Coefficient estimates and standard 
errors are reported in Table 6. 
  Parameter estimates generally have the expected sign, and tend to be statistically 
significant.  Those who we would expect to have greater disutility from congestion, etc... 
(i.e., from having a greater opportunity cost of time) face a higher imputed price for SUS 
healthcare.  This is true of older and more educated individuals, although once individuals 
are over the age of 60 (i.e., when they begin to retire), their imputed SUS healthcare price 
falls.  Individuals with higher incomes face a higher price, also because of a greater 
opportunity cost of time, and urban individuals face a greater cost than rural individuals, 
possibly because congestion problems are worse in the cities.  Individuals in the South, 
Southeast, and Center-West regions of Brazil face higher prices than those in the North and 
Northeast, and Blacks and those in the Mixed racial category face lower prices than Whites, 
while Asians face higher prices. 
  As a measure of model fit, we can compare  the predicted health coverage decisions 
of this model with the decisions observed in the data.  The model does well, correctly 
predicting the choices of 87% of all individuals.  When the model fails to predict correctly, 
it tends to be in the case of incorrectly forecasting the choices made by those individuals 
who opt for private health coverage; i.e., high-income, more educated, and older (younger 
than 60 years) individuals.             
 
 




4.1 Analyzing Welfare Effects of a Change in the Price of Public Healthcare 
 
  The initial goal of this research was to determine which groups in Brazilian society 
would suffer the most as a result of the increasing congestion of the public healthcare 
infrastructure that will likely accompany the socio-demographic trends we are currently 
observing.  In order to measure the welfare cost of increased waiting time for public health 
provision, which might result from an increase in the number of elderly Brazilians relying 
on the SUS without a corresponding increase in supply, we need only consider the effect on 
different individuals in the sample if the price of public healthcare were to increase (e.g., by 
50%), taking into account the optimizing insurance decision each person makes to this price 
increase.  Many individuals who had chosen public healthcare, for example, might stick with 
that choice and bear the brunt of the price increase, while others might find it optimal to pay 
more and switch to private healthcare.  Those who had chosen private health coverage prior 
to the price increase would experience no change in price or disposable income.  We 
simulate the decisions of each individual in the data set, backing-out the overall change in 
the price of receiving healthcare he or she faces after all is said and done.  Finally, we 
consider the difference in the natural logarithms of the prices ultimately faced by each 
individual, before and after the price change.  This measure provides us with a proportional 







H!  and Ii
!  represent the price of healthcare provision and the accompanying required 
level of income needed to reach the original level of utility, after the increase in the price of 
SUS health coverage.  Note that we cannot calculate the compensating variation in income 
directly, because we are unable to determine ∀ i for each individual.  This results from the 
fact that we do not observe an individual’s full income endowment (i.e., an endowment 
including the value of available time, etc...) – rather, we only see the individual’s monetary 
income, which is not expended at all if SUS healthcare is employed.  This means that it is 
impossible to ultimately determine whether the difference in log prices is attributable to a 
compensating variation in income, or to heterogeneity in preferences.  For the following 
discussion, we assume the former. 
  In order to quickly summarize the welfare implications of an increase in the price of 
SUS healthcare, like that which would accompany increasing congestion of that system, we 
regress this proportional measure on a vector of socio-demographic attributes, we are able to 
determine which groups in Brazilian society will suffer the most.  The difference in 
() ln ln ln ln
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magnitude of the effect across groups is something that we could not uncover from the 
simple Probit analysis described in Section 4.1, because that analysis did not describe how 
different types of individuals’ behaviors would change in response to a price change.  In all, 
the model predicts that 6.6% of all individuals consuming public healthcare prior to the price 
change would switch from public to private health coverage in response to this simulated 
price increase.  Accounting for optimizing responses is therefore important. 
  The results of this regression appear in Table 7.  Those in the South (i.e., the 
excluded region) fare worse than those in the rest of Brazil, especially the Center-West and 
Southeast.  Blacks and those in the Mixed racial group fare worse than Whites, while Asians 
generally do better (owing to their greater predisposition to have been using private 
healthcare before the price increase).  Older individuals do better (as they are also more 
likely to have been using private healthcare), until they reach the age of 60, at which point 
they generally rely more on public healthcare and do much worse.  Men generally fare 
worse than women, while those with more education and higher levels of income do better 
in the face of rising SUS prices, again reflecting predispositions towards using private health 
coverage. 
  Interpreting the results of this welfare analysis are complicated by the fact that we do 
not know whether the magnitudes we observe are differences in the level of income required 
to reach the original level of utility, or whether they simply reflect differences in 
individuals’ preferences for healthcare consumption (i.e., ∀ i).  Assuming that Ii is the level 
of household income reported in the PNAD survey, however, we can calculate expenditure 
shares for health coverage based on the observed prices for private healthcare and the 
imputed prices for SUS healthcare.  We do so for each individual in the 10% sample used 
above, and use them to calculate explicit measures of the compensating variation in income 
required to offset the increase in the price of SUS healthcare simulated above.  Table 8 
shows how these CV measures vary with observable socio-demographic attributes.  The 
results differ in some ways from those in Table 6.  In particular, increasingly educated 
individuals are worse-off, except for the highest education group.  Blacks, Asians, and those 
in the Mixed racial group all fare better than Whites, and older individuals (both above and 
below the age of 60) fare worse.  The most striking difference between these results and 
those presented in Table 6, which calls into question the validity of the assumption about 
income, is that wealthier individuals are made worse-off than poorer individuals by the 
increase in the SUS price – it is precisely these individuals that we would expect to be able 
to switch more easily to private health coverage, if they were not using it already, in 
response to an increase in the price of public coverage.  To the extent that these individuals 
could not switch, however, we might expect that they would suffer most from increased 
congestion, given their higher opportunity cost of time. 
 




  The apparatus developed above also allows us to consider the implications of 
counterfactual policies designed to offset increasing congestion in the provision of public 
healthcare, where a simple reduced-form analysis, like that described at the start of Section 
4.1, cannot.  In particular, we can consider the implication for individuals’ optimizing 
choices of a private healthcare subsidy, designed to expand the individual’s budget 
constraint only if the income is used for the purchase of private healthcare. The welfare 
implications of such a policy could then (with better data describing the full income 
endowment) be compared to the implications of a simple income subsidy that could be used 
for any sort of consumption, indicating the value of a relatively paternalistic policy. 
  In the absence of such data, we consider the welfare consequences of a simple 50% 
price subsidization of private healthcare (i.e., the government pays 50 cents on every 1 real 
spent by the individual on private healthcare).  In order to describe how the resulting welfare 
gains (again, a proportional measure of the compensating variation in income, assuming 
homogenous preferences, after the optimizing provider of healthcare is chosen￿) differ 
across socio-demographic groups, we regress them on a vector of socio-demographic 
attributes.  The results of this regression are described in Table 9.  Negative numbers 
describe reductions in income that return individuals to their original levels of utility (i.e., 
indicating a benefit).  Individuals in the Center-West and Southeast regions seem to benefit 
most from this price subsidy, while those in the North and Northeast benefit only marginally 
more than those in the South.  Whites and Asians benefit more than Blacks and those in the 
Mixed racial group, and those with higher levels of education benefit more than those with 
less education.  Similarly, richer individuals, women, and older individuals (under the age of 
60) benefit more from the subsidy.  Generally, these relative benefits reflect a greater 
predisposition towards (or propensity to switch to) private healthcare provision. 
  The natural question is how might such a private healthcare subsidization policy be 
targeted to benefit those individuals who would suffer most under an increase in the price of 
public care.  To the extent that such subsidies, when applied broadly, seem to benefit high-
income, high-education individuals, they simply represent a transfer of rents, since those 
individuals suffer less under the increasing price of public care than do the poor anyway.  
One possible option would be to implement the subsidy as part of an income tax collection 
regime, where participation criteria could be easily be established so as to allow the subsidy 
to be used only by low income residents.  Problems of fraud in the reporting of private 
healthcare expenditures might make this approach difficult, however.  Instead, we might 
                                                 
 
6 The model predicts that approximately 13.3% of all individuals consuming public healthcare prior to the price subsidy would switch to 
private health coverage.  With such a large increase in the demand for private healthcare, the government might want to undertake policies to 
facilitate entry by new private healthcare providers in addition to the subsidy, so as to avoid new congestion costs.   
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focus on the results of the first counterfactual simulation, and target subsidy funds 
geographically so as to reach those individuals who both lose most under the simulated 
increases in public prices.  Such is true, for example, of Black and Mixed race residents￿ of 
the South, Southeast, and Center-West, particularly those with low levels of education.   
Generally, these regions are viewed as being the developed regions of Brazil, and 
conventional wisdom might suggest that more would be gained by targeting resources to the 
less developed North and Northeast.  The results of this analysis, however, suggest that it is 
these excluded groups living in the developed parts of Brazil that would benefit the most 
from intervention to make private healthcare more affordable. 
  Finally, dealing with the impacts of rising public healthcare costs on the elderly (a 
major concern given current socio-demographic trends) by subsidizing the consumption of 
private healthcare seems more problematic, since those over the age of 60 are predicted to 
benefit less than most other groups from this policy.  This arises from the model’s prediction 
that members of this group are not as likely to switch to private health coverage even with 
the change in relative prices.  Indeed, in order to limit the adverse effects on this group of 
rising congestion in public healthcare consumption without affecting huge rent transfers to 
those who are less adversely impacted, the government will likely have to take steps to 
directly increase the supply of public healthcare provision. 
 
5. Conclusions and Extensions 
 
  The goal of this analysis was to determine which groups in Brazilian society were 
most “excluded” from private healthcare.  Private healthcare is generally considered to be of 
a higher quality level; this perception is generally supported by the PNAD survey data.  
Such exclusion is not of a direct form as would be racial exclusion from a club, but is rather 
based on individuals facing different relative prices for public and private healthcare owing 
to differences in their observable attributes and preferences for healthcare consumption.  Our 
initial analysis of PNAD survey data documents what is generally perceived to be the case -- 
that poor, rural, Black and Mixed-race Brazilians tend to rely more on public healthcare.  
This alone would not necessarily represent a source of social inequity, except that we expect 
the price of this form of healthcare to increase in the coming decades owing to the 
increasing congestion of an already-overburdened system, and we expect these groups to 
suffer most.  In order to determine how these price increases would be distributed over 
different socio-economic groups, we need a more elaborate model of optimal individual 
decision-making; i.e., a model that allows us to determine how individuals would behave 
                                                 
 
7  Reaching these particular racial groups might be difficult, unless the subsidies took the form of monies to establish new private 
healthcare facilities in racially segregated neighborhoods.    
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under current and counterfactual relative-price scenarios.  Operating under constraints of 
data availability, we assumed that each individual was required to consume a single unit of 
some form of healthcare coverage (i.e., public or private), and that differences in the quality 
of care across forms would be internalized in the price confronting the individual.   
Differences in price might also arise from observable individual attributes (i.e., a direct form 
of discrimination), or from an individual’s preferences for healthcare consumption (e.g., 
individuals with strong preferences for healthcare consumption might face an even higher 
price for an effective unit of public care than a similar individual who had weak preferences 
for healthcare consumption), but available data do not allow us to identify these effects.  
From a simple and stylized model of utility maximization, we were able to recover estimates 
of the price of public health coverage, and used those estimates to infer which socio-
demographic groups would suffer most from an increase in the congestion of the public 
healthcare system.  While the conclusions of this analysis conform to the general 
perceptions regarding race, education, and income groups, they suggest that the groups most 
at risk from an increase in the price of SUS healthcare would be the excluded racial and 
education groups in the southern half of the country, which, while developed, exhibits a 
great deal of social and income inequality. 
  With even more detailed data on the attributes of the alternative forms of healthcare 
provision, we might also be able to build a more realistic hedonic model in which 
individuals with weak preferences for healthcare would choose to consume the type that 
exhibits low-levels of amenities and a low price, while those who derive a great deal of 
utility from the consumption of healthcare might choose a “deluxe” form of healthcare 
provision.  This could be important in predicting how different individuals would respond to 
an increase in the congestion of the public system, which would increase waiting times for 
treatment (i.e., a specific trait of the healthcare commodity).  We might find, for example, 
that certain socio-demographic groups exhibit a strong distaste for waiting time, and they 
would thus tend to bear more of the burden of increasing congestion of the SUS.  Other 
survey data (e.g., the 1997 PPV) provide some indication of waiting time incurred in the 
receipt of healthcare services, but these data exhibit many missing observations, and it is 
unclear whether they will be appropriate for such an analysis. 
  Even with the limitations and simplifications described above, the current model is 
suggestive of which groups are most likely to suffer from the increasing congestion of the 
public healthcare infrastructure that is likely to accompany current demographic trends in 
Brazil.  From an equity perspective, these groups are generally those about whom we are 
most worried, suggesting that some policy (i.e., subsidization of private healthcare or the 
expansion of the public infrastructure) must be undertaken.  Which specific policy response 
to use depends upon which particular group we are most trying to help. 



















Perceptions of Healthcare Quality by Type 
 
Reason for failing to receive healthcare (for those seeking 
healthcare during previous two weeks) 


















Had To Wait 
Too Long 
Other 
0    93.6  31.1  53.3  4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4   
North 
1    97.7  0 50 0  0 25  25 
0    93.8  39.5 29.7 10.3  4.9  5.4  10.3   
NE 
1 98.2  15.4  7.7  15.4  0  7.7  53.9 
0  94.1  50 22.1  8.8 1.5 7.4  10.3   
CW 
1  96.8  50 40 10  0  0  0 
0 95.4  43.1 28.8 13.1  5  3.8  6.3   
SE 
1  98.8  52.9  23.5  0 0 0  23.5 
0  94.7  61.6  17.2  3 0 4  7.1   
South 
1 99.1  33.3 16.7 16.7  0  0  33.3 
0  94.6  45.6  28.5  9.3 3.6 4.9  8   
All 
1  98.5  36  24  8 0 4  28 
 






















Data Summary – Household Heads 
N = 98166 
    
Variable 
 
Mean Variable  Mean 
Sex 0.727  Age  44.524 
Educ 6.612  Age60  0.176 
Income 338.591  f_kind2  0.284 
Black 0.068  PrivHP  0.069 
White 0.526  whopay  0.101 
Mixed 0.400  Arthrit 0.148 
Yellow 0.004  Cancer 0.004 
Urban 0.831  Cardiac  0.074 
Metro 0.413  Cirrhose  0.003 
dcwest 0.109  Backache  0.312 
dseast 0.342  Depress  0.078 
dsouth 0.178  Diabets  0.037 
dnorth 0.068  Hipert 0.197 
dneast 0.302  Kidney  0.047 
With_HP 0.170  Respir  0.042 
Migrator 0.009  Tendon  0.032 
Value 79.474  Tuberc  0.002 
Attend 0.131  Healthy  0.491  
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Characteristics of Private Healthy Plan 
N=6639 
plcons 0.980  plexam  0.956 
pllist 0.925  plinter  0.929 
plreemb 0.310  platend  0.805 
plother 0.811  plmedic  0.045 
pldent 0.219  odonto  0.031 
paymore 0.178     







Probit Regression  
N = 82900, Log Likelihood = -16753.661 
 
 
      
Variable 
 
Estimate Standard  Error  Variable  Estimate Standard  Error 
Sex 
 
0.0051 0.0173  Dseast  0.3056 0.0345 
Educ 
 
0.1173 0.0020  Dneast  0.0823 0.0356 
Income 
 
0.0003 0.00001  Dsouth  0.0411  0.0374 
Black 
 
-0.4785 0.0855  Age  0.0233 0.0008 
White 
 
-0.1862 0.0785  Age60  -0.2696 0.0290 
Mixed 
 
-0.4284 0.0799  f_kind2  -0.0195 0.0206 
Dcwest 
 
-0.0668 0.0409  Constant  -3.3594 0.0964 
 
     
Table 4 
                                                                                                                             Probit Regression  



















































        
























Black   0.2166 
(2.308)** 










White   0.2207 
(2.406)** 










Mixed   0.2545 
 (2.764)* 






























































































N  95565 95565 95565 95565 95565  95565 
Log 
Likelihood 
-32729.57  -2274.64 -21995.40  -1875.49 -55542.89  -24502.90 
    
 





































































































































































































































N  95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 
Log  
Likelihoo 
-13340.13 -40920.07 -17382.01 -16213.18 -12853.73 -1107.16  -58161.94 
 1- Z- statistics are in parentheses 
* significance level for 1% 
** significance level for 5% 
 
                                                                                                           Table 5 
                                                                Heckman Procedure to Estimate the Price of the Public Health Services 
 




Estimate  Standard Error  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Sex 0.1914  0.0244  pllist  0.0280  0.0386 
Educ -0.0382  0.0492  plreemb 0.1252  0.0216 
Income 0.00001  0.00001  plother  0.2927  0.0268 
Black -0.0087  0.0557  plcons  -0.7845  0.0625 
White -0.1418  0.0276  plexam  0.1088  0.0559 
Yellow 0.1438  0.9555  plinter  0.5942  0.0413 
dcwest -0.1110  0.0564  pldent  -0.3128  0.0235 
dseast -0.2026  0.0484  plmedic  0.0395  0.0440 
dneast -0.0128  0.0492  odonto  -0.0045  0.0564  
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dsouth -0.1704  0.0514  paymore  -0.3670  0.0257 
age -0.0001  0.0013  depen  0.1983  0.0627 
Age60 0.1520  0.0391  fam_dep  0.1447  0.0620 
f_kind2 0.0492  0.0278  Constant  6.6104  0.1695 
platend -0.0104  0.0243       
Select 
Sex -0.0098  0.0163  dseast  0.2822  0.0319 
Educ 0.1161  0.0018  dneast  0.0626  0.0328 
Income 0.0003  0.00001  dsouth  0.0653  0.0345 
Black -0.0654  0.0350  age  0.0215  0.0008 
White 0.2188  0.0174  Age60  -0.1998  0.0274 
Yellow 0.4010  0.0769  f_kind2  0.0790  0.0199 
dcwest -0.0710  0.0377  Constant  -3.5883  0.0494 




                                                                                                     Table 6 
                                                                                          Determinants of ln Pi
S 
                                                                            N = 8267, Log-Likelihood = -2640.38 
     
Variable  Estimate  Standard Error  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Constant -0.020817  0.127874  Mixed    -0.211478  0.047998 
Male -0.227694  0.047326  Asian    0.273869  0.293929 
Migrator  0.150101  0.199747  Age  0.019145   2.03127 x 10
-3 
ED (5-8 yrs)  0.387136  0.054480  Age > 60   -0.105695   0.074067 
ED (9-12 yrs)  0.845308   0.058539  Income   1.99052 x 10
-4  9.27403 x 10
-6 
ED (12+ yrs)   1.34218   0.074263  Employee   -0.235912  0.053343 
North   -0.100590  0.094918  Self-Employed   -0.255233  0.053334 
Northeast -0.135340  0.067079  Domestic  Worker  -0.539780  0.119628 
Center-West  0.140623  0.069616  Metro 1   -0.025042  0.051464 
Southeast 0.110980  0.054015  Metro  2  -0.416106  0.048105 
Black -0.406526  0.092505  Family  Size  -0.043249  0.015133 
            
Table 6 
Socio-Demographic Effects on Proportional Measure of 
Compensating Income Variation From a 50% Increase in Pi
S 
N = 8267, R-squared = 0.659412 
         
Variable  Estimate  Standard Error  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Constant  0.419864  4.26638 x 10
-3  Mixed  0.011576  1.55395 x 10
-3 
Male  0.014097  1.70310 x 10
-3 Asian  -0.076258  0.013461 
Migrator -6.19360  x  10
-3  6.80662 x 10
-3 Age  -9.90146  x  10




ED (5-8 yrs)  -6.35279 x 10
-3  1.67772 x 10
-3  Age > 60  7.28907 x 10
-3  2.72447 x 10
-3 
ED (9-12 yrs)  -0.037660  1.98657 x 10
-3 Income  -2.79919  x  10
-5  7.59087 x 10
-7 
ED (12+ yrs)  -0.249227  3.41969 x 10
-3  Employee  0.015117  1.95085 x 10
-3 
North -1.70524  x  10
-3  3.28471 x 10
-3  Self-Employed  0.014800  1.95308 x 10
-3 
Northeast -2.96403  x  10
-3  2.16406 x 10
-3  Domestic Worker  0.018112  3.42039 x 10
-3 
Center-West -8.51688  x  10
-3  2.61514 x 10
-3  Metro 1   8.84075 x 10
-3  1.89919 x 10
-3 
Southeast -6.31576  x  10
-3  2.00423 x 10
-3  Metro 2  0.015212  1.57295 x 10
-3 
Black  0.017732  2.76538 x 10
-3  Family Size  1.51898 x 10
-3  4.27404 x 10
-4 
 













      
Table 7 
Socio-Demographic Effects on Compensating Income Variation 
From a 50% Increase in Pi
S (Ii Assumed to be Observed) 
N = 7644, R-squared = 0.402024 
      
Variable  Estimate  Standard Error  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Constant 168.845  18.8424  Mixed  -3.59553  6.77750 
Male -33.5610  7.68259  Asian  -22.9243  77.1354 
Migrator -50.4782  29.9692  Age  .070672  .299853 
ED (5-8 yrs)  36.0775  7.29269  Age > 60  7.32159  12.1295 
ED (9-12 yrs)  66.5361  8.97825  Income  .412354  0.00705 
ED (12+ yrs)  -81.0515  20.8902  Employee  -51.6785  8.84152 
North -1.49066  14.5177  Self-Employed  -47.4406  8.76669 
Northeast -58.1799  9.58748  Domestic  Worker  -64.0738  14.9596 
Center-West  -32.8344  11.6064  Metro 1   -21.8923  8.51166 
Southeast -5.66378  8.96483  Metro  2  -59.2504  6.90262 









Socio-Demographic Effects on Proportional Measure of 
Compensating Income Variation From a 50% Reduction in Pi
P 
N = 8267, R-squared = 0.697525  
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Variable  Estimate  Standard Error  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error 
Constant  0.023276  7.38658 x 10
-3  Mixed  0.031053  2.69043 x 10
-3 
Male  0.031212  2.94866 x 10
-3 Asian  -.144877  .023305 
Migrator -7.06999  x  10
-3 .011785  Age  -2.47009  x  10
-3  1.16727 x 10
-4 
ED (5-8 yrs)  -0.023735  2.90472 x 10
-3  Age > 60  0.024978  4.71700 x 10
-3 
ED (9-12 yrs)  -0.105878  3.43945 x 10
-3 Income  -4.35465  x  10
-4  1.31424 x 10
-6 
ED (12+ yrs)   -0.465490  5.92066 x 10
-3  Employee  0.039820  3.37760 x 10
-3 
North -4.99453  x  10
-3  5.68696 x 10
-3  Self-Employed  0.038266  3.38146 x 10
-3 
Northeast -4.25265  x  10
-3  3.74674 x 10
-3  Domestic Worker  0.053847  5.92188 x 10
-3 
Center-West  -0.025216  4.52770 x 10
-3  Metro 1   0.017479  3.28815 x 10
-3 
Southeast  -0.017338  3.47001 x 10
-3  Metro 2  0.039686  2.72332 x 10
-3 
Black  0.049946  4.78783 x 10
-3  Family Size  3.88479 x 10
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